FUNDAMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY ( FP ) |
(The nature of PSYCHE)
Chapter 1. FACTS and OPINIONS
1.7. Experimental base
1.7.4. The ORDINARY as EXOTIC
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On the other hand, phenomena, familiar since the childhood, occurring dozens and thousands times a day, remain to be not explained in NAS frameworks, i.e. they appear merely habitual, but inherently mysterious, surprising, unexpected.
The classical psychology, submitted most competently/authoritatively by officially authorized text- and reference-books, divides psychical phenomena –
- into three categories (accordingly to three spheres of this activity):
– in full conformity with V.I.Lenin's interpretation of formation of Homo sapiens individual as an active person [ 67 ], namely: from (a) alive contemplation to (b) abstract thinking, and from it to (g) practice –
(a) the emotions, arising at this alive contemplation;
(b) the thoughts, arising at this alive contemplation;
(g) the volition as the means for change of objects (phenomena/situations) of this alive contemplation.
Such an interpretation and such division (are lawful, but) are not productive in the sense that they do not allow to consider/analyze/explain neither
· periods of an individual passivity, i.e. processes of vital activity [ 6А ], averaging up to a third of all longevity (and more than half of the early childhood), nor, which is the main,
· details, mechanisms both separate (the a ÷ g ) stages of activity and transitions from one stage to another.
This interpretation does not disclose a black box of psyche (see section 1.4), but only divides it into three separate boxes (compartments), the same black, substantially closed. Psyche mechanisms of phenomena, base for each of these three directions, remain to be mysterious, representations of them are rather intuitive, than rational.
In particular (a), V.N.Pushkin (В.Н. Пушкин, 1931-79) in one of his last articles (published in 1980 ) shows that adequacy of an perception image to perceived object cannot be explained on the basis of common ideas of physiology. He analyzes in turn each of probable variants of coding by the brain of information received from sense organs, –
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· biological: coding at a cellular level (возбуждение ё торможениеexcitationёinhibition);
· chemical: at a molecular level;
· physical, at an electromagnetic level, –
and convinces himself (convinces a reader), that each of them, by virtue of their basic principle hieroglyph-character, inherent in coding [ 109, p. 327], has obviously insufficient informational capacities /resources/reserves.
In particular (b), P.Ja. Galperin/П.Я. Гальперин [ 24, p. 37] defines attention, the phenomenon of a thought, of a consciousness orientation to a certain object, as control: Not any control is attention, but any attention is control. Such an approach is valuable practically, as a psychical technique: if you want to be attentive - so control object of your attention. However, the control is not more fundamental concept, than the attention. Attraction of this concept changes nothing in understanding of the phenomenon essence: the psychological/theoretical contents of the attention concept remains not opened, as well as the control concept. Besides such an explanation can be related only to voluntary attention. The attention involuntary continues at that to remain not understanable antipode of the voluntary one; and such it is from the everyday point of view: The involuntary attention is an attention of the inattentive and constantly distracting person (Tszen N.V./Н.В. Цзен [135, page 42]). But in fact the sharp border between these two kinds of attention does not exist.
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P.Milner warns researchers of attention [ 83, p. 367]]: we would avoid the temptation to explain the activity of regulating of attention to some "little man" [sitting in a head]; otherwise we'll face the problem of research of his mechanisms. It is very difficult, however, to avoid this trap because of absence of a reasonable hypothesis how regulation of attention can be carried out without this "little man".
In particular (g), V.A. Ivannikov/В.А. Иванников, the author of a doctoral thesis on a problem of volition , contended in two years (!) after its defend that the black box of this phenomenon is closed so substantially, that it is useless even to try to open it: ... we cannot open now the nature of volition effort [49, pages 7-9]; that the concept volition should be excluded from sphere of scientific consideration: ... our task is to pass from an analysis of nature of volition as a non-understadable mental phenomenon to an analysis of those situations which have generated a problem of volition [the same, page 9]. The latest is equivalent to an appeal to return to behaviourism. We have not to justify, but to understand V.A. Ivannikov's pessimism, when find the statements mutually, and even internally, inconsistent, beginning already from definitions of the concept, in immense mass of publications on the problem:
· volition is one of forms of reflection by a brain of the reality (V.I. Selivanov/В.И. Селиванов ), and
· volition is conscious regulation by a person of his behaviour and activity, expressed in ability to overcome internal and external difficulties at fulfilment of expedient actions and deeds (the same V.I.Selivanov/В.И. Селиванов );
Примечательно на этом фоне, как названа диссертация самого В.А. Иванникова: "Психологические механизмы волевой регуляции" - психологические (научные), а не психические (природные).
On this background the title is remarkable of V.A.Ivannikov's dissertation: "Psychological mechanisms of volition regulation" - psychological (scientific), but not psyche (natural) one.
· volition is the highest participation of a person's consciousness in a process of generation at the social level of acting (V.I. Selivanov/В.И. Селиванов, ), and
· we admit presence in volition of not realized components (V.P.Prjadein/В.П. Прядеин,);
[By the way: here V.P.Prjadein speaks about natural preconditions of volition activity, and thus puts volition activity itself outside of the Nature];
· · volition is perception by a person of completion of deficiency of prompting (V.I.Selivanov/В.И. Селиванов, 1986 ), and
·· volition is an active aspect of reason and moral feelings (A.C. Puni/А.Ц. Пуни );
· volition is a disposition of the activity directed on the sphere of values (Sh.N. Chhartishvili/Ш.Н. Чхартишвили, ), and
· volition is a regulating element in the conflict of personal and social consciousnesses (L.B. Lejkum/Л.Б. Лейкум, );
· volition is a mechanism of overcoming of internal barriers (A.P. Kolisnyk/А.П. Колиснык, ), and
· self-management of psyche functional structure and of the level of resource expenses in behaviour and activity (V.K. Kalin/В.К. Калин, [54, page 43]), or
· subjective perception of reorganization of psyche (aims) and organism (muscular tensions and preadjustment) to new prompting (V.S.Ivashkin/В.С. Ивашкин, [50, page 22]).
It is remarkable on this background that V.A.Ivannikov's dissertation is named: "Psychological mechanisms of volition regularities" - psychological (scientific) but not psyhe (natural).
Absence at psychology of knowledge of mechanisms of base psyche processes (these mechanisms are the theme of chapters 2÷6) affects painfully upon whole NAS (the modern science), but first of all upon medicine. In particular, the psychiatry cannot effectively work, for example, with hallucination (considered as pathology of perception), not knowing mechanisms of perception; or with obsessive states and narcotic dependences, not knowing mechanisms of volition and lack-of-will.